Blacklisting -the attempt by employers or employment agencies to avoid employing a known trade union activist by compiling or referring to an information databasehas a long history within the UK construction industry, where it is particularly difficult to bring about effective trade union organisation (McIvor, 1988) . Through collusion between employers, workers have been denied employment or engagement and union organisation has been undermined. It has been a part of the approach to construction workforce management in the UK because of the challenge of sustaining direct supervision and effective line management in a workplace or work situations that vary daily and where employer control is difficult to sustain.
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Blacklisting is not exclusive to construction of course and is certainly not exclusive to the UK since dismissal of union members was a significant feature of mid-twentieth century anti-Communist activities in the USA (Filippelli and McColloch, 1995: 155) .
The activities of the UK construction employer alliance, the Consulting Association (CA) were terminated in 2009 amid a flurry of publicity that tarnished the reputation of the companies who had been associated with it. The CA staff had monitored individuals, especially those from the construction industry, whose names had been associated with trade union, environmental or socialist activities and provided information about them, through a subscription service supported by major construction contractors and employers. They were able to access information and use it as a basis for decisions about employment This paper argues that blacklisting in the form in which it appeared via the CA is a historic phenomenon unlikely to return. Employers have grouped together in their legal defence against compensation for blacklisted workers and have, together, admitted liability and offered an apology (Syal, 2015) . At the time of writing a Court case is pending. Yet the ending of this form of blacklisting may not bring an end to anti-union initiatives. There is evidence that paths diverge in enterprise practice with research pointing to some positive initiatives where client requirements and the influence of parent companies are brought to bear. However, contextual factors impact on management behaviours in different ways. A legacy of low trust remains, together with a belief, not confined to trade union representatives, that anti-union behaviour will be continued in some form. The short-term and peripatetic nature of construction work, the effects of sub-contracting, the use of self-employed labour through agencies and umbrella companies as well as the number of non-English speakers on some sites continue to make it difficult for trade unions to organise effectively at site level.
The paper is structured as follows. Firstly we discuss the literature that deals with employer resistance to trade unions and offer a brief overview of the history of blacklisting in construction. We explain the research design and methodology underlying this paper and then report on findings. Finally, we comment on the questions posed.
Employer resistance to trade unions
Whilst there are studies that address the challenges of trade union organization at an industry level (e.g. Heery et al, 2004) interest in employer resistance to trade unions in the UK has largely focused on the question of trade union recognition within the enterprise, particularly following the creation of the statutory mechanism for trade union recognition (e.g. Dundon, 2002; Gall, 2004 ). An employer alliance such as the CA, co-existing with the structures of national collective agreements and providing a collaborative form of employer resistance to trade union organization, is different from resistance to recognition evidenced in enterprise based examples and deserves separate attention. Kelly (1998) argues that conflict is inherent in the employment relationship and that employers will inevitably seek to resist unionization. He points to the tactics that are deployed to contain union power including legislation to curb strike action and derecognition of unions (P. 102). It is a view echoed by Smith and Chamberlain in their account of the effects of blacklisting as they report stories of victimisation and intimidation in the construction industry going back over many years (although they use the term 'blacklisting' to encompass a range of other anti-union initiatives) (Smith and Chamberlain, 2015) . In a study of employer resistance to trade union organisation in the textile industry of the southern USA, Roy (1980) highlights the diversity of employer anti-union responses, ranging from intimidation (fear stuff), the offer of benefits or personal advantage (sweet stuff) and anti-union propaganda association trade unions with the forces of evil (evil stuff). Even where the union wins representation rights, employer resistance may continue and union organising efforts 6 prove futile (fatal stuff). Gall (2004) extends Roy's typology whilst focussing particularly on union recognition campaigns but the classifications offered do not encompass the silent operation of an external anti-union body such as the CA. Logan, (2006) reporting on anti-union initiatives in the regulatory climate of the USA points to the importance of external actors, including consultants, law firms, industry psychologists and strike management firms, but does not refer to employer collusion.
Significantly for our argument, Logan points out that organisations that support antiunion behaviour by employers, themselves experience a fall in business as union strength declines. Heery and Simms (2010) , reviewing the effectiveness of union organisation campaigns, point to the importance of employer policy as an important influence on the potential for unionisation. Employers may co-operate and form alliances to deal with trades unions, but they may also adopt divergent paths in their responses to union organising campaigns. Whilst some resist unionisation, others deploy alternative forms of worker participation. The response they make may be shaped by public policy and in some instances they may not seek to block unionisation. In some cases, they say, there will be no one dominant response and a contingency perspective may apply. A contingency perspective suggests that variations in product markets, ownership and governance arrangements and business strategy and structure will all play a part in shaping employer responses (Purcell and Ahlstrand, 1994) . Dundon (2002) points to the complexity of workplace processes and the importance of structural, ideological and cultural factors in shaping employer anti-union activities.
He dismisses the quest for 'management style' (Purcell, 1987) on the basis that such typologies have a tendency to represent the 'ideal' rather than the 'real' (Dundon, 7 2002: 235) . However, Purcell argued that "if management style exists at all…we have to allow for an element of choice which might be more or less constrained. Thus the study of management style is not primarily an analysis of outcomes but of originating philosophies and policies which influence action." (Purcell, 1987: 534 ). Dundon's analysis of the complexities of workplace processes is relevant to this account but so too is the notion of management style in enterprises where there is a strong shaping influence from a parent company or founder.
A dual approach -known as double-breasting -is sometimes used by multinationals where collective bargaining is in operation in one location whilst elsewhere trade unions are resisted (Beaumont and Harris, 1992; Cullinane et al., 2012 and Dundon et al (2015 ). Northrup (1995) points to the ways in which such practices were deployed by US construction employers, using both approaches simultaneously for different sites (open and closed shop), with the intention of reducing the advantages and cost of the union mark-up on the unionised site. Cullinane et al (2012) argue that employer moves to adopt parallel and apparently contradictory perspectives on employment relations are not necessarily the product of carefully formulated, rational choice. Rather such perspectives may be random and ad hoc. The literature on double breasting has relevance to the discussion of blacklisting that follows because of the complex -and sometimes contradictory -perspectives that are in evidence within the UK construction industry.
We turn now to the history of blacklisting in construction and discuss the purpose that it has served.
Blacklisting: some history
Blacklisting -taken here to mean the attempt by employers or employment agencies to avoid employing a known trade union activist by compiling or referring to an information database -has a long history within the UK construction industry (McIvor, 1988) where it is (and has long been) particularly difficult to bring about effective trade union organisation. Through a process of surveillance and record keeping workers were denied employment or engagement. It has historically been a part of the collective approach by employers to construction workforce management in the UK because of workforce mobility and the challenge of sustaining direct supervision and effective line management in a workplace or work situations that vary daily.
For the purposes of this narrative, the story begins with the Economic League, created in the aftermath of the 1 st World War. Blacklisting -countering subversion in industry as it claimed -was a part of its activities since the 1920s (Economic League, 1981) . Industrial conflict in the 1960s and 70s fuelled employer willingness to step up blacklisting in the construction sector (Winder, evidence, Scottish Affairs Committee, 2013: Ev188) . The 1972 national building strike lasting for 13 weeks over the summer of 1972 took place at a time when the wider trade union movement was engaged in a battle against the 1971 Industrial Relations Act and the Government had determined to crack down on trade union resistance (Wood, 1979 , chapter 1). The strike itself was ultimately resolved through the national negotiating machinery then in place but employers subsequently compiled a 'dossier' of picketing activity that was presented to government ministers (Wood, 1979:31) . Action for criminal conspiracy followed and six trade union activists were imprisoned as a consequence.
Significantly, public files relating to this aspect of the strike have yet to be released so a full understanding of events -particularly of the relations between employers, the Police and Government of the day -is more limited than it should be (Boffey, 2015) .
After 1972 this legacy weighed on employer attitudes to the management of industrial relations in the construction sector in three different ways. Firstly, it added weight to their reasons for deploying sub-contractors and self-employed labour -facilitated by the 1971 Finance Act which introduced the construction industry tax deduction scheme (Seely, 2015: 12) . Secondly, it fostered continued support by employers for national collective bargaining since the 1972 strike and subsequent court cases served to separate national union leaders from their own activists, facilitating dispute resolution at national level at the expense of rank and file action (Wood, 1979: 33) .
Employers' associations in building and civil engineering, as well as in electrical contracting, plumbing and engineering construction, continued national level negotiations with trade unions for the whole of this period. Thirdly, it encouraged some major employers to continue their support for blacklisting as a final line of defence against trade union militancy through the Economic League until its closure in 1993 and then subsequently through the Consulting Association.
The Economic League was a phenomenon reflecting the political polarisation of the years between 1919 and 1993. In a world divided between communism and capitalism its espoused purpose was to resist subversion in industry and, with the ending of that chasm in global politics, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the satellite economies, it might have seemed that the battle had been won. Communism was defeated and with that defeat came the ending of communist influence in trades unions. But this was not the end of blacklisting.
Records of the Services Group of the League, concerned particularly with construction, were transferred to the CA, established at about the same time and supported by Robert McAlpine Ltd. Some 18 major construction companies were affiliated at the outset (HoC SAC, 2013: Ev138). 1 . According to accounts given to the Scottish Affairs Committee, the CA provided three key services to subscribing companies. Firstly it held a 'bank of information' or blacklist that could be accessed via subscribing companies. Where a company submitted individual names of potential workers, staff at the CA would undertake a search for which an additional charge was made and provide a return to the subscribing company indicating whether any of the names were on the CA list. Companies also had the right to update information held and in this way could participate actively in sharing their views for blacklisting purposes. Secondly, the CA held networking events. Thirdly, searches of radical literature were used to update the files. Where an organisation wanted information it was customary for a list to be faxed across to the CA, for the checks to be undertaken and the CA to phone back to a named contact -an HR or industrial relations manager -with a response (Notes (typescript) from Ian Kerr, dated 23/12). An odd feature of the arrangement was that by this stage many of the major contractors who were associated with this practice employed very few workers -most being engaged through the supply chain. Given a new burst of life by disputes in the electrical contracting sector toward the end of the 20 th century, particularly on the Jubilee Line Extension, the CA continued its work as a subscription organisation providing blacklisting services until 2009, by which time media reports had exposed activities that were then challenged by the Information Commissioner who closed the organisation down. The Blacklists Regulations, proposed at an earlier date but not enacted, were brought into effect by the Labour government in 2010 (Blacklists Regulations, 2010) .
Over the past six years blacklisting activity has been scrutinised particularly through the enquiries of the Scottish Affairs Committee (HoC SAC 2013; . (Guney, Clark and Ryan, 2014) . Some of the legal cases on behalf of over 600 individuals have now been settled whilst others are outstanding.
In the meantime a further collaborative initiative by employers, the Construction Workers Compensation Scheme (CWCS), was launched with the intention of resolving claims outside of the courts. The Scheme was discussed with construction trades unions without agreement being reached, but was launched and publicised by the contractors' group to MPs with a message that implied union involvement (HoC SAC, 2015) . Perhaps predictably, the unions had been unwilling to agree the terms but with this public relations 'own goal' the contractors left the moral high ground to the BSG.
The CWCS offers a fast track route to a payment up to a maximum of £20,000. A full review, involving a calculation of loss of earnings could lead to an award of up to £100,000. It is a condition of joining that applicants will not bring or continue to pursue any claims through the court. Free legal advice is available to potential applicants before entering into this process, enabling people to think about how to approach the claim -whether to follow the fast track route or to opt for a full review toward a bigger claim (HoC SAC, 2015) . Given the age profile of many of the claimants (many of whom were blacklisted decades ago) it may seem surprising that so few have opted for the CWCS. Historically blacklisting has served as one of a range of negative employer devices to maximise employer control at site level and it is impossible to rule out the risk, as one interviewee suggested, that at enterprise level, lists are maintained to prevent known activists being recruited.
'Does blacklisting continue at company level?' (Interviewer) "I would say so, yeh. I think…it wouldn't be as widespread as it was. There might be a company -let's say for instance McAlpines -that would probably, they'll have something the amount of jobs they have, it's sort of… If someone wasn't liked because of his health and safety views, I think they might have something in house where they'll say we'll make sure we don't employ you again".

Convener, formerly blacklisted
Another interviewee (employer representative) said that it is right to be concerned about the use that employers might make of social media.
It is not the purpose of this paper to debate the position of individuals who say that they have been blacklisted, but where particular cases were analysed by a former blacklisted worker their substance was disputed (Wainwright blog, 2013) . Our understanding should be tempered with the awareness that campaigners might use the term 'blacklisting' to encompass a much wider span of employer activities reflecting resistance to union activity on site.
The majority of contractors currently defending their involvement with the CA -and of course there are others who were not involved -have Codes of Ethics and commitments on health and safety management that suggest that union involvement should be welcome. Yet it is difficult to foster a climate of trust and mutual respect against the backdrop of a negative legacy and some of the comments made by interviewees reflect the suspicions that remain. In an industry in which employment is insecure and short-term, where self-employment and agency labour are widespread, threats and fears of unemployment constitute a powerful disincentive for individuals to join a union or stand for union office. Only significant and positive employer responses could enable a more positive employment relations climate.
Employer Responses
The eight contractors who acknowledged their involvement with the CA are currently allied in their legal representation in defending the case against them and they are at the time of writing, seeking to minimise damages (Interview with legal specialist).
Others have denied involvement even though in some cases their organisations had demonstrable previous connections to the CA. Despite collaboration on the legal front, there are differences between construction leaders in their attitude toward trade unions and the management of employment relations, reflecting amongst other factors, the nature of their organisations, the influence of founders or of parent companies and the values of the clients that they serve.
The general context of operations is as follows. Whilst forms of contract vary in the construction industry, there is in general a well-established process, whereby major contractors compete for contracts, sometimes alone, sometimes as part of a joint venture and on occasions with the co-operation of major sub-contractors.
Management of the supply chain is critical to effective performance and tier one subcontractors will be carefully selected and able to perform in the way prescribed by the main contractor (Mead and Gruneberg, 2013) .
"We like to think we employ competent, reliable contractors, which we do in the main through an extensive audit process before we get them onto our framework if you like, so there's a degree of confidence that they're going to employ people properly, perform properly once they're on the project... But …. it's fair to say, we rely on our trade contractors to comply with their contract obligations and, stating the obvious, to comply with the law…"
Project Director Company A Contracts are parcelled out to sub-contractors, who in turn often sub-sub-contract, with employment responsibilities often transferred to agencies who use pay-roll or 'umbrella' companies to pay self-employed workers (interview data -project director and self-employed operative). Some of the bigger sub-contractors, for example in building services, retain significant core numbers of employees but will also use selfemployed workers to expand their workforce when required. This approach to management may have its origins in financial expediency but the fragmentation that results diminishes the likelihood of effective trade union organisation. It is compounded by the short time span that many workers are on site and, in London at least, by the variety of languages spoken. Romanian, Punjabi and English were the main languages for induction on the two (London) sites visited. Some non-English speakers relied on a group leader who could speak English in order to communicate and as the convener steward commented, there is no way of knowing whether that individual also functions as a ganger. It is important to note that in general the major contractors would have no direct control over who the sub-contractors bring on site other than to ensure that they have the right to work in the UK and that they have the skill level and health and safety accreditation that is required by the Construction Skills Certification Scheme (CSCS) (interview -project director).
Within this overall context, two key factors appear to be at work in shaping the position adopted by major contractors; external or client-focussed and internal or 22 enterprise focussed. Despite the association between employers on the legal front, evidence suggests that there are significant differences at enterprise level.
The influence of the client and the nature of the individual contract on which the contractor is engaged is a key determinant of contractor attitudes and behaviour in relation to trade unions -attitudes and behaviour which may be passed on through the sub-contracting process to their tier 2 or tier 3 sub-contractors. This influence may be positive. One (client) interviewee outlined his approach and expectations for a major project, saying that he often referred back in his thinking to positive developments on other major projects -notably Heathrow T5 and the London 2012 Olympic site. He was aware that the contractors working (or expected to work) on his project had been engaged in blacklisting in the past but his project would aim for structural arrangements that provide direct employment and the opportunity for a union presence. In this context contractors -some of them with a history of blacklistingwill have an interest in compliance and in co-operation with unions and auditing arrangements will be set in place to ensure that this is what they do. Public sector contracts, those with more experienced clients and those with a significant public profile -hospitals, local authority contracts and universities -may follow a similar Anecdotally it is also more likely to prefer a non-union environment.
Not all of the contractors demonstrate the influence of enterprise values in the same measure. Like others, Company B had a history of engagement both with trade unions and with the CA. They had sustained involvement with national collective bargaining and observed the protocols associated with the national agreement to the extent that trade union officers were allowed access to the workforce. A senior interviewee suggested that, since use of the CA had been limited, there had been no need for a radical review of policies after its activities were exposed.
In concluding this section then, we note that some of the bigger clients play an important part in shaping contractor/supplier relations and as a second order issue (for them), the climate for employment relations. Major projects are sometimes shaped in turn by public policy -either positively or negatively (client interview). Whilst this was the case in a positive fashion at the London Olympic site (Druker and White, 2013) and at Heathrow T5 (Deakin and Koukiadaki, 2009) , interviewees suggested that the Ministry of Defence, as a client, was behind some of the impetus for blacklisting in the past, but we have no other evidence to substantiate this view.
Without conscious intervention from clients, the competitive environment drives a more random and ad hoc series of approaches that limits or works against unionisation encouraging the practice of double breasting. Company values and practices vary and, whilst employers had been associated together in the past through the CA and subsequently through legal defence of their behaviour, there is evidence of different -and in some cases more positive -routes being selected subsequently. However construction union UCATT is certainly under pressure and, at the time of writing is confronting significant financial losses with a deficit of almost £3.5 million in 2014 (UCATT, 2014) and faces the prospect of being absorbed into another unionmost likely UNITE. This would leave two construction unions -UNITE and the GMB, with UNITE -which comprises the former EETPU (via Amicus) having the majority of blacklist cases to address. The survival of national collective agreements continues to provide a cloak of credibility for the unions but the reality for union officers is that site organisation is a continuing challenge, perhaps more easily confronted by the electricians, who featured disproportionately in CA files than by bricklayers or carpenters.
Union positioning and the future of employment relations
Blacklisting has become a totemic issue for construction unions. Their success in winning compensation for blacklisted workers could shore up their reputation for 27 being able to do something for workers in the industry, perhaps countering the view (expressed by two non-union workers interviewed) that unions lack the power to defend worker interests. One interviewee suggested that trade union officers talk up the significance of blacklisting as a distraction from other challenges. Another suggested that, whilst they had pursued Employment Tribunal cases for individuals, they had done nothing to prompt a collective response.
Firstly, unions face the challenge of recruiting self-employed workers. Union membership was described as "a waste of time" by one interviewee (self-employed slip form operator), although another, commenting on the abuses of payroll companies said that his union membership gave him more control, power and backing if he had a problem. Finally, in an industry where trade union organisation is an on-going challenge, union leaders are able to claim the moral high ground by supporting blacklisted workers.
Whilst the CA may be of historic rather than current interest, union leaders are unlikely to forego the publicity associated with what they expect to be a winning legal case.
Discussion and conclusion
An employer association to contain the power of trade unions, the Consulting Association survived for many years as an alliance that operated covertly and with individuals unaware that they had been targeted. Like the external organisations identified by Logan (2006) Employer values with regard to trade union organization are inherently pragmatic.
They are not automatically or necessarily anti-union, although the espoused ideology of some senior characters within the industry suggests that this is the case. Rather, in line with comments from Heery and Simms (2010) they will accept and work with trade unions where this seems to be a requirement because of the nature of the contract or the environment in which they are located. Their responses to initiatives from trade union organisers are contingent upon business circumstances but also of course on the pressures to which they may be subject from union activists and campaigners.
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The CA seems to have been ill equipped to operate in today's employment environment, with little evidence of the systems that might be expected to be in place if it were seriously geared for its purpose. This is not to make light of the impact of its activities. The individuals who were pinpointed remained without work, sometimes for many years and suffered the devastating loss of their livelihood without knowing why this had happened. Yet the process was idiosyncratic and other activists, who were shop stewards, with long-standing commitment to their union activity, were apparently unaffected. The impression that is created is of an organization that was inconsistent in its approach and (fortunately) ill suited to its task of managing and communicating information. Had the CA been more efficient it could have been far more damaging.
Its survival through until the first decade of the 21 st century seems to be an anachronism. Blacklisting might have been expected to be of historic rather than current interest since the conflict that had marked construction sites in the 1960s and early 70s was no longer in evidence. Trade union organization in the private sector of the construction industry is now limited and outside of engineering construction and electrical contracting shop steward organization is uncommon. Direct employment has diminished and sub-contracting is the norm with workers often on site for very short periods of time, engaged through agencies, compounding the challenge for unions of recruitment. Labour mobility within the European Union means that the construction workforce is fragmented by language too with construction sites comprising workers from different parts of the EU and elsewhere.
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These developments suggest that an employer alliance of the type organised by the CA -bringing together different contractor organisations -is unlikely to be in existence today. It is difficult, of course to prove that there is no longer an interorganisational collaboration to blacklist and there are those who argue that web-based information and social media make it more, rather than less likely. However, there are two key reasons for believing that this form of anti-unionism is now primarily of historic interest. Firstly, firms that seek to manage their reputation and to win clients both in the private and in the public sector might be expected to operate lawfully and the law is tighter now than it was before 2010. Secondly, an employer alliance of the type that existed historically would be high risk, precisely because it is now specifically designated as unlawful and because of the possibility that a whistle blower could expose unlawful activities. This does not preclude on-line monitoring and enterprise level surveillance but even here, implementation of a blacklist would be a high-risk scenario for contractors who engage workers only through the subcontract process -and who would have to co-ordinate responses with and rely on the discretion of sub-contractors. Employer values reflect a variety of complex -and at times conflicting -pressures. These include the nature of the organisation and its history, the values and priorities of current leaders, the type of work that is undertaken and the degree of freedom and flexibility permitted to project directors and site level managers. To an extent, the approaches adopted historically were always inclined to be random but after the spotlight of public investigation and media coverage of the less savoury aspects of the industry's practices, there may be greater attention by decision takers to ensuring that their activities are at the least, lawful and within the framework of public accountability.
Blacklisting of the CA variety will disappear, as Logan (2006) suggests, simply because it is no longer needed. Double breasting identified by Dundon, 2002; Cullinane et al, 2012; and Dundon, 2015 will continue, not on the Northrup model (1995) where non-union sites are used to counter the costs of those that are unionised.
Rather, larger and more significant sites will continue to have a union presence where public policy, key clients or lead contractors play a particular part in setting standards, for example on direct employment, and access for union officers to recruit. Access to major contractors for the research for this paper was impeded because of concerns about litigation, but the evidence that has emerged points to the continuing influence of founders or parent companies in some cases in the responses to exposure of the CA. That influence has been blurred over time by the effect of mergers, especially when firms have come together with very different management styles giving rise to apparently schizophrenic views from management on the benefits or disadvantages of trade unionism. There are many different reasons why a site may be unionised and the fragmented nature of worker engagement is an on-going obstacle for union recruitment. Yet where a strong founder or parent company influence is in evidence (as sometimes it is), this provides a default setting for the direction taken after the demise of the CA.
In asking whether blacklisting continues, we cannot rule out a company level database (for example through an employment agency) being used to identify rank and file activists who have been perceived to constitute a risk to the smooth running of a site or project. Of course this is not the same as an employer alliance of the type provided by the CA and an infringement of data protection legislation could be more easily disguised within the enterprise and there might be a lesser likelihood of disclosure or 33
whistleblowing. Yet since the construction workforce is highly mobile, the benefits of sharing information -with other contractors or with sub-contractors -would be lost.
Indeed there are doubts as to the benefits for the individual employer. Many of the (relatively small number of) activists -in the Blacklist Support Group, for exampleare known by name within the industry and contractors do not need a register or data base to identify them and to prevent them from gaining employment. In practice, induction arrangements make it a relatively simple task to check names against those arriving for (or having passed through) induction. However we have no evidence that this is happening -only that people fear that it could happen. Such widespread fears betoken a low level of trust for the contractors who hold the power within this situation and do not promise well for the future of employment relations or for employee engagement within the industry. Poor industrial relations has the potential to bedevil contracts and that is particularly the case where the industry is buoyant and projects are at a stage that exposes their managers to the effects of industrial actionfor example of the type encountered by electricians on the Jubilee Line Extension.
Evidence suggests that, in line with findings from Wright and Brown, (2013) , that union conveners, appointed by trade unions but on the payroll of contractors, play an important part in laying the basis for trade union organisation in circumstances where this would otherwise be impossible. Where the role exists (and it is not common), it allows for a measure of workforce participation, addressing individual grievances and focussing particularly on working conditions and health and safety issues, although it is rare to find interventions that relate to pay. It does not rule out the possibility of double breasting but it does provide a first line of defence for trade unions in an industry where there are otherwise few support mechanisms.
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The future of employment relations within the construction industry will be played out with different faces if UCATT disappears into UNITE or the GMB. On 1 st September 2015 a new employers' organisation was launched. Build UK brings together 27 of the industry's largest main contractors with a wide range of specialist contractors in the supply chain, opening the potential for clearer and more positive standards to be set on a number of major issues although not, as yet, collective bargaining. There is no necessary reason why industry standards in the construction sector have to be imposed by clients or by public policy but for the moment it seems that the ad hoc and reactive nature of management is likely to continue.
